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This paper explores the impact of citizens’ motivation to vote on the pattern of fiscal federalism. If the 
only concern of instrumental citizens was outcome they would have little incentive to vote because the 
probability that a single vote might change an electoral outcome is usually minuscule. If voters turn out 
in large numbers to derive intrinsic value from action, how will these voters choose when considering the 
role local jurisdictions should play? The first section of the paper assesses the weight that expressive voters 
attach to an instrumental evaluation of alternative outcomes. Predictions are tested with reference to case 
study analysis of the way Swiss voters assessed the role their local jurisdiction should play. The relevance 
of this analysis is also assessed with reference to the choice that voters express when considering other local 
issues. Textbook analysis of fiscal federalism is premised on the assumption that voters register choice 
just as ‘consumers’ reveal demand for services in a market, but how robust is this analogy?  
1. INTRODUCTION 
Government spending and taxation are usually assessed with reference to the 
preferences of a representative voter and, if communities rely on a simple 
majority (50%+1) voting rule, the representative voter is the median voter.1 
This textbook approach is applied when assessing the way that voters assign 
fiscal responsibilities to decentralized jurisdictions (Bradford and Oates, 1971). It is 
premised on the assumption that voters express choice just as consumers 
reveal demand. Voters are described as taxpaying-consumers; they reveal 
                                                 
* This is a revised version of a paper presented at the Conference, “Ex Uno Plures, Welfare 
Without Illusion,” Sapienza University of Rome, September 2009. The authors would like to 
acknowledge helpful comments from participants at the Conference. If there are errors, they are 
the sole responsibility of the authors.    
1 The preferences of the median voter are analyzed to predict the outcome of an election if 
preferences are single-peaked and issues are uni-dimensional. 
choice in a “political market” (Peacock, 1992:49-58). How helpful is this analogy 
when studying fiscal federalism?  
Instrumental citizens (focused on outcome) have little incentive to vote when 
the probability that a single vote will change an electoral outcome is minuscule 
(Mueller, 2003). A growing empirical literature explains high turnout rates with 
reference to the intrinsic value voters derive from the act of voting. The 
architects of utility theory (e.g. Bentham, 1789) recognized that individuals derive 
value from action as well as from outcome contingent on action but, as theory 
evolved, attention came to focus on ‘outcome’ (Loewenstein, 1999). What if voters 
are also “...intrinsically motivated to perform an activity when one receives no 
apparent reward except the activity itself…” (Deci, 1971:105)?  
Voters might derive intrinsic value from action in many ways but, as this 
paper considers choice, the focus is on intrinsic value derived by expressing 
choice (see Jones and Dawson, 2008). Textbooks assume that voters assess the 
assignment of fiscal responsibilities with reference to outcome. The 
expectation is that voters will assess the benefits they are likely to experience if 
services more closely match local preferences and the costs they might incur if 
they lose economies of scale (Oates, 1972).2 But what if citizens also derive 
intrinsic value when they express identity with their local community?  
Section 2 of the paper focuses on voters’ preferences for the assignment of 
fiscal responsibility to a local community. Predictions are tested with reference 
to a case study of Swiss voters but, as case studies are seldom sufficient to 
sustain general conclusions, later sections of the paper consider the ways that 
the theory of expressive voting might also explain other choices registered at 
the ballot box. With a growing empirical literature that emphasizes voters’ 
motivation to express identity, how relevant are expressions of identity when 
analyzing patterns of fiscal federalism? 
2. CHOICE AT THE BALLOT BOX  
Instrumental citizens consider the benefit (X) that is derived from one electoral 
outcome rather than another. If the probability that a voter might influence an 
electoral outcome is p, the expected utility from voting is pX. Citizens incur 
transactions costs of voting (T) when they gather information and register their 
vote. Instrumental citizens vote if net expected utility (NEU) is positive: 
NEU  =  pX - T  > 0.      (1) 
                                                 
2 As noted in Gruber (2007), this assessment is often augmented with consideration of the 
spillovers citizens may enjoy from taxpayers in other local jurisdictions. 
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If the probability that one vote will change an electoral outcome is minuscule, 
the net expected utility from voting is likely to be negative (Downs, 1957), but 
citizens turn out to vote in large numbers nonetheless (Aldrich, 1997). The 
‘paradox of voting’ can be explained with reference to intrinsic motivation. 
Riker and Ordeshook (1968) and Ashenfelter and Kelly (1975) argue that 
citizens derive intrinsic value when they fulfill civic duty.3 Fiorina (1976) and 
Brennan and Lomasky (1993) argue that individuals derive intrinsic value by 
expressing their preference in collective decision-making processes.  
Aldrich (1997:385) distinguishes between intrinsic value derived by fulfilling 
civic duty and by “expressing …preferences” but, in essence, there is a 
common theme. Citizens vote to express identity with the community and with 
policies that affect the community. Choice is a signal of self-image – to voters 
themselves in secret ballots, and to others in open ballots and when voters 
report their electoral identity.4  
Akerlof and Kranton survey an empirical literature that emphasizes the 
importance of identity. They conclude that “…a person's identity describes gains 
and losses in utility from behavior that conforms or departs from the norms for 
particular social categories in particular situations” (2005:12). Wallis (2003:227) 
argues that individuals “…define who they are in terms of the people they 
interact with and how they interact” and that individuals also take action to 
affirm identity even when identity is pre-ordained (by race or by nationality, etc.). 
Copeland and Laband (2002) report a strong correlation between the decision to 
vote and ‘political expressiveness’ (e.g. wearing campaign buttons, posting 
political signs and contributions via income tax returns).  
If individuals derive intrinsic value from expressive action (E), they will vote if: 
NEU  =  pX + E – T  > 0     (2) 
Some suggest that E only depends on turning out to vote and that, having 
turned out to vote, citizens register choice instrumentally. Brennan and 
Lomasky (1985:194) argue that this implies “…motivational schizophrenia” and 
Elster (1986:26) comments: 
                                                 
3 Downs referred to civic duty by arguing that instrumental citizens vote because otherwise 
democracy will not survive. But this implies that they would vote to promote a public good; 
instrumental voters would not incur these costs (Aldrich, 1997). This paper focuses on intrinsic 
motivation. 
4 Citizens derive intrinsic value by expressing self-image at the ballot box in secret ballots and 
later - for as Hamlin and Jennings (2009:12) argue: “I can surely hold that I wish to express my 
political views in all sorts of public…arenas, and the only way in which I can make these expressions 
in future while maintaining a degree of internal consistency and integrity is to vote expressively.”  
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“…to explain that people vote, an appeal to civic duty or similar 
normative concepts seems inevitable; to explain how they vote, the 
appeal to self-interest is usually deemed sufficient (Barry, 1978). It is as if 
the voter, upon entering the voting booth, sheds the social motivations 
that had carried him there. Surely, this cannot be the right 
conceptualisation –but what is?” (author’s emphasis). 
The decision of whether to vote is important when considering how to vote (e.g. 
Jones and Dawson, 2007). Citizens derive intrinsic value from the way they act and 
there are strong incentives at the ballot box to act expressively.  
To illustrate, compare the choice an individual makes as a consumer and the 
choice that the same citizen would make as a voter: 
(i) A citizen chooses between a small-engine motor car and a large-engine 
motor car. If choice were solely instrumental, the citizen would prefer the 
large-engine motor car. However, as a consumer the individual is also able to 
derive intrinsic value by expressing identity with the community (E) and by 
choosing the small-engine motor car (the large-engine model would increase 
pollution costs for the community).5 The ‘price’ of choosing the small-engine 
motor car is the net utility that would have been derived from the large-engine 
motor car. This depends on the cost (C) of loss of additional (instrumental) 
utility that would have been derived by consuming the large-engine motor car, 
net of the cost-saving experienced by choosing the small-engine motor car (B). 
The ‘price’ of expressive action is (C−B). The consumer chooses the small-
engine car if E > (C−B). 
(ii) At the ballot box, the same citizen is now asked to approve legislation to 
ban large-engine motor cars. The net cost to the citizen (in terms of loss of the 
large-engine motor car) is (C−B), but the weight that the citizen gives to (C−B) 
is quite different. The ‘price’ of expressive action is lower. The price is p (the 
probability that a vote will prove significant in decision-making) multiplied by 
the net instrumental utility that the consumer would derive from a large-engine 
motor car. The ‘price’ of voting to ban large engine motor cars is p(C−B). The 
same citizen is far more likely to choose expressively (to approve the 
legislation) because the price is only p(C−B). Ex ante each voter’s incentive is 
                                                 
5 Consumers pay more for ‘eco-labelled’ products to express environmental concern (Zarrilli 
et al., 1997). Investors choose lower-yielding ethical investment to identify with preferred 
production processes (Lewis et al., 1998). 
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to act expressively but, if all act this way, ex post each voter experiences the cost 
(C−B). The voter approves the legislation if E > p(C−B).6 
How does this distinction apply when considering preferences for the 
decentralized provision of local services? The first question considered is how 
does expressive voting affect the way that individuals vote to assign fiscal 
responsibilities to their local jurisdiction. The individual considers the extent to 
which the provision of local services (primary education, street lighting and 
refuse collection) should be the responsibility of the local jurisdiction. 
Therefore ‘quantity’ in Figure 1 refers to the number of services that the voter 
considers the prerogative of the local community.  
When voting for local control, the voter derives diminishing marginal intrinsic 
value (E) by identifying with the local community (i.e. by calling for greater 
local provision of services). The ‘price’ of expressive action is the cost that will 
be incurred (by increasing local authority provision of services). The voter 
experiences additional tax cost (C) by rejecting the cost savings that would be 
possible (from economies of scale) if service provision were the responsibility 
of a larger jurisdiction. If the individual gains B because there is a better match 
between service provision and local preferences, the cost in calling for local 
autonomy is (C−B).7  
If each local voter chooses as a ‘taxpaying-consumer,’ each individual chooses 
q1 services to assign to the local community. But, if each citizen recognizes that 
a single vote has very little impact on outcome, the ‘price’ of expressive action 
is only p(C−B) and each citizen prefers that q2 services are provided locally. 
Even though voters derive intrinsic value (E) from expressive action, 
devolution of fiscal responsibility to the local community is ‘excessive’ (the 
costs equal ∆123 in Figure 1). 
Later sections of the paper focus on how an individual chooses the ‘quantity’ 
of a good such as education (and the comparison is between q0 and q2). Here 
the comparison is between q1 and q2 and ‘quantity’ refers to the number of 
services citizens would devolve to their local jurisdiction. The next section tests 
the proposition that they prefer greater devolution when they choose as voters 
(rather than as consumer-taxpayers). 
 
                                                 
6 Even if satisfaction from expressive approval (E) differed in the two examples (in one case it 
is by voting and in the other by purchasing), it remains the case that ‘choice’ depends on the 
‘price’ of expressive approval (as experienced in each forum).  
7 The cost might increase as more services are assigned to the local community, but to ease 
exposition (C−B) is constant in Figure 1. 
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 A plethora of empirical studies indicate that voters choose expressively. Voters 
rely more heavily on symbols than on ‘pocket book’ evaluation (e.g. Sears et al., 1980). 
Voters are more likely to support collective provision of services the more 
they choose to participate in collective decision-making (Pommerehne et al., 1997; 
Jones and Dawson, 2008). But is this theory relevant when analyzing patterns of 
fiscal federalism?  
3. DEVOLVING FISCAL RESPONSIBILITY: A CASE STUDY 
The Swiss villages of Corcelles-Cormondrèche (hereafter Corcelles, about 
4400 inhabitants) and Peseux (about 5600 inhabitants) are neighbors in the 
conurbation of the small town of Neuchâtel (about 32,400 inhabitants). In 
June 2003 residents in these local jurisdictions received a questionnaire. The 
questionnaire asked: 
“Would you agree that cooperation between Corcelles-Cormondrèche 
and Peseux should be strengthened?”  
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If respondents answered ‘yes,’ they were then asked whether cooperation 
should take the form of: (i) restricted and specific cooperation (for confined 
public services only); (ii) systematic cooperation (for clusters of public 
services), or (iii) amalgamation (a new single municipality with a single 
municipal legislature and a single executive). Replies were anonymous.8  
With reference to the discussion in section 2 of this paper, the important 
observation is that the questionnaire implicitly directed respondents to consider 
issues instrumentally. As citizens later expressed choice at the ballot box, it is 
possible to test the proposition that the incentive to vote expressively is relevant. 
Respondents to questionnaires were directed to consider a list of ‘key issues’ 
that focused on outcome (Keating, 1995).9 They were asked whether they had 
‘hopes’ or ‘fears’ (just as decision-makers are sometimes asked if they see 
change as a ‘strength,’ ‘weakness,’ ‘opportunity’ or ‘threat’ in a SWOT analysis). 
They were directed to focus on: 
(i) Tax: citizens might hope for cost savings (from economies of scale), 
but be fearful if there was an absence of competition.10  
(ii) Services: citizens might fear they would lose the match between service 
provision and local preferences (Oates, 1972; Gassmann, 1993; Vojnovic, 2000), 
but hope for economies of scope (Steiner, 2003:556).  
(iii) Development: citizens might hope for gains derived by pooling 
resources (Swianiewicz, 2002:10; Thiessen, 2004).  
                                                 
8 Citizens were informed that there would be a lottery draw with a prize randomly awarded to 
two respondents. The questionnaire was introduced by a personal letter, addressed and signed by 
the President of the municipality (the Mayor). 
9 Keating (1995) reviews the arguments of supporters and opponents of consolidated local 
government according to four great issues: efficiency, democracy, distribution and development. 
The spectrum of concerns presented to respondents put aside the issue of distribution since 
upper tiers rather than municipalities are responsible for such policies.  
10 An empirical literature already highlights sensitivity to tax. This is often evident for high-
income citizens. Leuenberger’s (1999) exit poll of voters in the Swiss municipality of Jona 
indicated that the main reason why voters rejected the proposal to amalgamate with the 
municipality of Rapperswil was that they did not believe the government’s promise that taxes 
would not increase as a consequence (Jona was the wealthiest of the two jurisdictions and the 
one with the lowest tax rates). Filer and Kenny (1980) referred to the same consideration when 
analyzing 52 city-county consolidations between 1949 and 1976 in the United States. They 
reported greater ‘fear’ the wider the gap between median incomes in the two jurisdictions. 
Brink (2004) drew attention to preference for secession by voters in the more wealthy 
municipalities when studying the break-up of Swedish municipalities. 
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(iv) Politics: citizens might hope for more competition between local 
politicians responsible for providing services (Dafflon, 1998:140; Steiner, 
2003:556).  
(v) Power: citizens might hope that collaboration would increase their 
bargaining power (with other municipalities and with central government).  
(vi) Control: citizens might fear that they would lose control of local 
government as the size of the jurisdiction increased (Poel, 2000; OECD, 2005).  
(vii) Identity: if citizens ‘consumed’ a bond with their jurisdiction’s armorial 
bearing (Kushner & Siegel, 2003), they might fear the loss of this affiliation. 
The expectation was that citizens in Corcelles would experience a closer 
bond. Corcelles, 30% smaller than Peseux, lies further west (next to 
Peseux, but not abutting Neuchâtel). Peseux is geographically closer to 
the town of Neuchâtel (lying right to the west of it). 
Questionnaire respondents were asked to consider pros and cons that related 
to outcome.11 Their responses can be compared with the choice citizens 
expressed at the ballot box, but the first objective is to show that their 
questionnaire response was instrumental. Questionnaire responses appeared 
instrumental because:  
(i) If questionnaire responses were instrumental, tax and local service provision were likely 
to prove more salient than other considerations: As in Figure 1, these considerations 
are more likely to resonate with consumers. Consideration of other ‘key issues’ 
(i.e. development, politics, power and control) are less likely to resonate 
because they assume the properties of public goods.  
An analysis of response indicates that tax cost and service provision were the 
most salient issues. Table 1 reveals that this concern was mentioned by 
approximately 40% of respondents in both municipalities as a hope (column 
“hopes only”). When considering their overall importance (i.e. inclusive of their 
importance to voters who still found it difficult to discern whether they 
constituted a hope or a fear) they were dominant (e.g. as a potential ‘hope’ they 
were cited by 86% of respondents in Corcelles and by 89% of voters in Peseux).  
 
 
                                                 
11 The ‘key issues’ were presented to all respondents in the following order: ‘development,’ 
‘services,’ ‘tax/cost,’ ‘power,’ ‘control,’ ‘identity,’ and ‘politics.’ 
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Table 1. Hopes and Fears of Closer Cooperation (%) 
Corc. Pes. Corc. Pes. Corc. Pes. Corc. Pes. Corc. Pes.
a b c d e f a+e b+f c+e d+f
Tax/Cost 37.8 39.1 8.2 5.2 48.1 49.7 86.0 88.8 56.3 55.0
Services 37.8 39.1 8.2 5.2 48.1 49.7 86.0 88.8 56.3 55.0
Development 39.9 39.1 10.8 10.3 13.8 17.0 53.8 56.1 24.7 27.3
Politics 7.2 7.7 29.7 26.4 3.7 4.0 10.9 11.7 33.4 30.4
Power 40.6 34.1 7.1 7.0 6.3 7.2 46.9 41.3 13.4 14.2
Control 40.6 34.1 7.1 7.0 6.3 7.2 46.9 41.3 13.4 14.2
Identity 4.3 7.7 44.3 35.8 5.4 3.6 9.6 11.3 49.7 39.4
Hopes only Fears only Hopes FearsHopes
and fears
 
 (ii) If questionnaire responses were instrumental, citizens in the smaller community were 
likely to have more to fear from collaboration: Following Tullock (1959), theory 
predicts that minorities are vulnerable to the costs that are imposed by 
majorities if communities rely on a simple majority voting rule (50%+1). If 
individuals considered collaboration instrumentally, the prediction is that 
residents in a smaller jurisdiction would be more likely to resist collaboration.  
To test the proposition that residents in the smaller jurisdiction would have 
more to fear, Table 2 presents the results of a logit analysis of respondents’ 
decisions to accept (or reject) amalgamation. The explanatory variables are the 
concerns that respondents quote (a specific hope or fear is set as 1; 0). 
Marginal effects estimate the impact of each item on the likelihood that 
someone would agree to amalgamation. They reveal the ‘key issues’ that 
exerted the largest impact on willingness to accept amalgamation and they 
show the relative importance of the ‘key issues’ in the two jurisdictions.  
 As anticipated, all ‘hopes’ (premised on instrumental cost, C, and instrumental 
benefit, B) affect positively the likelihood that someone might agree to 
amalgamation, whereas all ‘fears’ affect decisions negatively.12 However, with 
reference to predictions premised on the size of jurisdiction, fear about future 
tax costs was more relevant (i.e. more negative) for citizens in Corcelles and less 
relevant for citizens in Peseux who would constitute the new majority.13 
                                                 
12 In Table 2 the percentage of correctly predicted outcomes is slightly higher for the 
respondents of Corcelles (76%), and so is the McFadden’s R2. The predicted value that the 
average respondent considers amalgamation as the most appropriate form of cooperation is 25% 
in Corcelles and 46% in Peseux, quite close to the result of the survey (23% and 43%). 
13 To some extent this fear might also have reflected the observation that residents of Corcelles 
paid a local tax equivalent to 89.4% of the tax they paid to the upper-canton-tier, but those in 
Peseux paid 94.0%. 
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Table 2. A Logit Model of Respondents’ Assessment of Amalgamation a 
Coef z stat b Marg.effect c Coef z stat b Marg.effect c
Hopes
H_Tax/Cost 0.7669 ** 2.78 0.1240 0.5863 ** 2.63 0.1403
H_Services 0.4586 * 2.28 0.0849 0.3226 * 2.00 0.0798
H_Development 0.7420 ** 3.96 0.1367 0.7086 ** 4.45 0.1735
H_Politics 0.3469 1.29 0.0696 0.4349 * 2.02 0.1083
H_Power 0.4781 * 2.44 0.0905 0.3971 * 2.46 0.0986
H_Control 0.4776 1.68 0.0981 0.6765 ** 3.23 0.1672
H Identity 0.1624 0.53 0.0316 0.1416 0.65 0.0353
Fears
F_Tax/Cost -0.9407 ** -5.39 -0.1820 -0.1161 -0.87 -0.0289
F_Services -0.4120 * -2.38 -0.0759 -0.3537 * -2.55 -0.0873
F_Development -0.2522 -1.29 -0.0460 -0.3698 * -2.47 -0.0909
F_Politics -0.8329 ** -4.49 -0.1462 -0.3762 ** -2.67 -0.0926
F_Power -0.8019 ** -3.21 -0.1288 -0.3563 * -2.03 -0.0871
F_Control -0.5503 ** -3.16 -0.0996 -0.3695 ** -2.72 -0.0910
F Identity -0.6772 ** -3.91 -0.1278 -0.3325 * -2.46 -0.0822
constant -1.0630 * -2.32 -0.8916 * -2.42
N 951 1159
McFadden’s R2 0.0839 0.0322
Correctly predicted 75.81% 58.58%
Predicted value 0.25206 0.46156
Corcelles Peseux
 
a. Dependent variable is the acceptance (=1), or rejection (=0) of an amalgamation. 
b. *, ** denotes significance at the 5% or 1% respectively (two-tailed). 
c. Since all explanatory variables are dummy variables, the marginal effect is when the value flips 
from 0 to 1; it is estimated at the means of the independent variables. 
 
(iii) If responses were instrumental, citizens in the smaller jurisdiction would be more likely 
to resist their loss of a bond with their local community. The consumption value of a 
bond is quite different to the intrinsic value that is derived from action expressing 
identity. The consumption value of the bond depends on outcome (rather than 
action). An individual may consume a bond without any expressive action.  
Studies on social identity suggest that such a bond is stronger in smaller 
communities.14 The prediction is that instrumental citizens are more likely to 
‘fear’ this loss in the smaller community. Table 1 indicates that the bond was 
important for all citizens (a result that proves consistent with evidence in other 
studies of Swiss decentralization, e.g. Steiner (2003)) but that fear of losing this 
bond was stronger in the smaller jurisdiction (Corcelles).  
                                                 
14 Analysis of social identity theory often focuses on group size. Liebkind et al. (2008:636) 
consider the literature that relies on group size to explain ‘intergroup bias’ (defined as a 
“…systematic tendency to evaluate the in-group and its members more favourably than the out-
group and its members”). 
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When considering all of these issues, citizens in the larger jurisdiction were 
more positive. 91% of respondents in the larger jurisdiction (Peseux) were 
prepared to consider closer cooperation but only 82% were prepared to 
consider closer cooperation in the smaller jurisdiction (Corcelles). Now the 
question is whether choice differed systematically at the ballot box.  
The analysis presented in Figure 1 predicts that:  
 voters will systematically discount instrumental evaluation by expressing identity 
with local provision of services  
 voters in the large jurisdiction are more likely to resist collaboration, because in the 
larger jurisdiction (where p is lower) there is an even greater incentive to discount 
instrumental evaluation.  
On 9 December 2007 citizens voted in a referendum. They were asked 
whether they were prepared to accept amalgamation between the two 
jurisdictions. In the questionnaire only 23% of citizens in Corcelles approved 
amalgamation as compared with 42% in the larger jurisdiction of Peseux. But if 
expressive voting theory were relevant, voters in the larger jurisdiction (Peseux) 
would be less willing to amalgamate (because p is lower and there is greater 
incentive to discount instrumental evaluation to vote expressively).  
Table 3 compares the results of the questionnaire and the referendum. At the 
ballot box, 59% of voters in Corcelles approved amalgamation but only 43% of 
voters approved amalgamation in the larger jurisdiction (Peseux). As predicted 
(with reference to Figure 1), voters in the larger jurisdiction attached greater 
weight to expressions of identity and were less willing to relinquish support for 
devolved provision of services.15 
 
                                                 
15 The law required that a majority of the voters accept the proposal in each municipality and 
the two municipalities did not amalgamate.  
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Table 3. A Comparison of Survey and Referendum Results 
Corcelles Peseux
2003-survey outline
Number of inhabitants (2003) 4074 5594
Number of registered voters (2003) and distributed questionnaires 3055 4211
Number of returned questionnaires 1274 1471
Response rate 42% 35%
Respondant who would agree to strenghten the cooperation 82% 91%
Agreement to a given form of cooperation
No Cooperation 5% 5%
Restricted and Specific Cooperation 65% 59%
Systematic Cooperation 40% 47%
Amalgamation 23% 42%
2007-referendum outcome
Number of inhabitants (2007) 4405 5648
Number of registered voters (2007) 3293 4179
Number of voters who show to the polls 2038 1937
Turnout rate 62% 46%
Number of voters who …
… accept the amalgamation 1202 837
… reject the amalgamation 836 1100
Rate of acceptance 59% 43%
 
There are always qualifications when focusing on a single case study. It is always 
difficult to impute motivation from behavior. While it is impossible to ask 
individuals to consider the same question instrumentally and expressively at the 
same moment of time, it is impossible to dismiss the possibility that preferences 
change over time. Of course, in this context, it is important to note that the 
evidence suggests that it is the strength of intrinsic motivation that systematically 
atrophies over time (and, in this case, the observation that expressive voting is 
still relevant highlights the importance of incentives at the ballot box).16 Also 
questionnaire studies are inevitably sensitive to the criticism that responses 
depend on the way questions are asked and this study is no exception.17 
Yet, for all of these qualifications, results are consistent with the proposition 
that choice depends on the forum in which individuals express choice. If 
                                                 
16 The evidence is that intrinsic motivation is ‘crowded out’ the longer the time span over 
which individuals assess costs and benefits (Frey et al., 1996).    
17 It is difficult to make direct comparisons between ‘support for amalgamation by 
questionnaire respondents’ and ‘electoral support for amalgamation.’ Questionnaire respondents 
were offered a menu of co-operative possibilities. Also, the comparison is between the sample of 
questionnaire responses and responses at the ballot box (rather than between the response that 
each individual made in a survey and at the ballot box).  
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patterns of fiscal federalism depend on voters’ preferences, patterns of fiscal 
responsibility differ systematically from patterns predicted with reference to 
Oates’ (1972) instrumental comparison of costs and benefits. 
4. THE RELEVANCE OF CASE STUDIES 
One way of assessing the significance of this case study is to consider whether 
the same interpretation proves relevant when considering other fiscal 
federalism issues. In this section of the paper q (in Figure 1) refers to the 
provision of a specific local service. The question is whether choice at the 
ballot box is still sensitive to the incentive to vote expressively. 
4.1. THE PROVISION OF WELFARE SERVICES  
The importance of the forum in which choice is expressed can be highlighted 
by considering provision of a collective good. In a large group an instrumental 
citizen would attempt to ‘free ride’ rather than contribute voluntarily to the 
provision of a collective good (Buchanan, 1968). An individual who derives 
intrinsic value from expression of identity (by contributing to a collective good) 
might contribute if E exceeds the cost of contribution (C) minus the expected 
benefit (pB) of the contribution (when p is the probability that a single 
donation will prove effective in supplying the collective good). In Figure 1 the 
price of a voluntary contribution is C−pB.  
If the same citizen is asked to contribute to provision of a collective good via 
a tax-financed program, the ‘price’ of expressive voting is p(C−B) when, in this 
case, p is the probability that a single vote will be effective. If, in each instance, 
the values of C and B are identical and, if the probability that a single vote will 
be effective equals the probability that a contribution to a collective good will 
be significant (both approaching zero), the same individual will approve greater 
provision of a collective good at the ballot box. In Figure 1 the citizen 
voluntarily contributes to provide q0 units, but votes for q2 units if there is a 
tax-financed program. 
It is possible to analyze altruism as the provision of a collective good (Hochman 
and Rodgers, 1969). If citizens consider contributing in order to altruistically provide 
a welfare service, the prediction is that there will be greater provision at the ballot 
box, and that provision will be greater the lower the perception that a single vote 
is significant. Sobel and Wagner (2004) tested this proposition with reference to 
the significance of a single vote in 49 states in the USA between 1972 and 1996. 
They concluded that “…the probability of casting the decisive vote is an 
important determinant of welfare spending…” and that “…a ten percent 
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reduction in the probability of casting the decisive vote generally leads to 
approximately a 6 per cent increase in public welfare spending…” (2004:151). 
The evidence is consistent with the proposition that fiscal federalism is 
sensitive to the incentives that voters face at the ballot box.18  
4.2. THE ‘FLYPAPER EFFECT’  
The argument that individuals attach greater importance to expressive action at 
the ballot box is relevant when considering the ‘flypaper effect.’ If local voters 
expressed ‘demand’ instrumentally, their response to an increase in private 
income would be the same as their response to receipt of an unconditional lump 
sum grant from the federal government. The evidence is that voters prefer to 
increase local services by between 5 and 10 cents when private income increases 
by $1, but by between 40 cents and $1 when they are in receipt of a $1 
unconditional lump sum grant. Hines and Thaler (1995) refer to Arthur Okun’s 
description of this as the ‘flypaper effect’ (‘money sticks where it hits’).  
Arguments based on instrumental rationality (see Bailey and Connolly, 1998) fail to 
explain the flypaper effect (see Hines and Thaler’s 1995 critique). Analysis based on 
expressive action offers a different approach.19 Individuals’ perceptions of the 
intrinsic value of action depend on moral considerations and on the 
observation that action is acknowledged (e.g. Deci and Ryan, 1980, 1985; Frey, 1997). 
When considering the flypaper effect, receipt of a grant is a signal that 
acknowledges the intrinsic value of support for a local community. Citizens are 
more likely to vote expressively for greater collective provision (to support the 
local jurisdiction) if they feel such action is acknowledged.  
To illustrate, consider the median voter’s preferences in Figure 2(a). They are 
represented by I 1  and I 2  (preferences are homothetic to the origin and the 
income consumption curve is ICC). The initial budget is 1-2. This representative 
voter chooses g1 of a local service (G). When private income increases, the 
budget line shifts to 3-4. Now the voter prefers g2 (there is a relatively small 
income effect g1−g2). The voter chooses to reduce local taxes from 1−y1 to 1−y2 
(the increase in income ‘crowds out’ local finance for g1−g0 units  (Knight, 2002)). 
                                                 
18 The authors considered Tullock’s (1973:23) observation that citizens “…vote charitably and act 
selfishly….” Welfare provision was analyzed as an altruistic act. As predicted by the relative 
importance of C−pB and p(C−B) in Figure 1, citizens are systematically more altruistic when 
they vote (see Brennan and Lomasky, 1993; Hudson and Jones, 1994; and Mueller, 2003, for 
reviews of empirical studies). 
19 Hines and Thaler (1995) explain the flypaper effect with reference to the theory of ‘mental 
accounting’ but it is still necessary to explain why choice might differ when spending from 
different ‘accounts.’  
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The evidence is that crowd-out is far less (and sometimes there is no crowd-out). 
In Figure 2(a) there is no crowd-out if receipt of an intergovernmental grant 
acknowledges the intrinsic value of action that supports a local community.20 
As this signal enhances perceptions of the intrinsic value of identifying with a 
local community (and this changes the pattern of the indifference curves), the 
new set of indifference curves (homothetic to the origin, with income 
consumption curve ICC′) are illustrated by I′2. In this case, local finance for 
provision by the local jurisdiction is 1−y1 before receipt of the grant and 1−y1 
after provision of the grant.  
When perceptions of the intrinsic value of expressive action depend on 
signals that acknowledge action, individuals are more willing to vote for 
spending (because the community is in receipt of a grant). In Figure 2(b) an 
increase in income shifts E from E1  to E2  (expressive action is a ‘normal’ good) 
but an increase in income received by a local grant shifts E from E1  to E3 .  
Once again, the same theory of expressive voting proves relevant when 
explaining choice at the ballot box. 
5. CONCLUSIONS AND POLICY IMPLICATIONS 
In 1999 Oates reflected on recent developments in the theory of fiscal federalism. 
He argued that there was “…some interesting work to be done … exploring…the 
extent to which people in geographical subareas of a country identify…with that 
area” (1999:1124). This paper considers the relevance of local identity and the 
incentive that citizens have to express identity at the ballot box.  
Expressive voting is relevant when citizens choose to assign fiscal 
responsibility. Citizens call for greater local autonomy in the provision of 
services than would be anticipated with reference to Oates’ (1972) analysis of 
‘optimal’ fiscal federalism. A case study of Swiss citizens is consistent with 
the proposition that choice is sensitive to the forum in which it is expressed. 
The choice that citizens make as ‘consumer taxpayers’ differs systematically 
from the choice they express at the ballot box. While this study adds to a 
growing empirical literature that highlights the relevance of expressive voting 
(e.g. Cummings et al., 1997; Carter and Guerette, 1992; Jones and Dawson, 2007), it is the 
first study to assess the relevance of expressive voting when voters choose to 
assign fiscal responsibilities to different tiers of government.  
Such analysis is important when reflecting on criticisms of the way that fiscal 
responsibilities have been assigned in the European Union (EU). Mueller (2003) 
                                                 
20 In a different context, Feld and Frey show how potent these signals can be. They refer to a 
‘psychological contract’ (2002:87) between local residents and local authorities. 
484 / REVIEW OF LAW AND ECONOMICS 6:3, 2010
Review of Law & Economics, © 2010 by bepress
compares the role that the EU budget plays with the role it ‘should’ play if costs 
and benefits are assessed instrumentally (as in Oates, 1972). Fewer responsibilities 
are assigned to the EU than anticipated. Expressive voters are reluctant to 
transfer fiscal responsibilities to more remote government tiers. The implication 
is that, if responsibility is to be transferred to the EU budget, citizens must vote 
as ‘European citizens’ (rather than as citizens of nation states).  
Expressive voting is also relevant when considering the provision of welfare 
services. Once again, the evidence is consistent with the proposition that 
electoral choice depends on expressions of identity with local communities. 
Alesina et al. (1999) show that willingness to provide welfare-state services will 
increase if citizens are able to identify with others of the same ethnic group 
(provision is lower if there is ethnic fragmentation in the community). When 
analyzing local provision of services, expressions of identity are also 
important. So much so that local provision of welfare services increases as the 
‘price’ of electoral expressions of identity decreases. 
The third issue considered in this paper is the observation that expressive 
voting also proves relevant when explaining the ‘flypaper effect.’ This behavior 
is difficult to reconcile with the assumption that voters choose instrumentally 
(see Cullis and Jones, 2009, for a literature review). By comparison, it is consistent with 
the observation that citizens vote to express identity with their local 
community. When the award of an intergovernmental grant acknowledges the 
value of supporting the local community, citizens respond by approving greater 
expenditure than predicted (to support the local community).  
The arguments in this paper do not depend on the assumption that voters 
make an accurate assessment of the significance of a single vote or on the 
assumption that each voter makes the same assessment. Voters may sometimes 
exaggerate the significance of a single vote.21 The arguments depend only on 
the assumption that voters are more likely to discount the significance of a 
single vote in a large electorate.  
Other explanations have been presented to explain why patterns of fiscal 
federalism differ systematically from patterns prescribed with reference to Oates’ 
(1972) ‘decentralization theorem’ (e.g. Hindricks and Myles, 2006), but the distinctive 
argument in this paper is that these differences depend on citizens’ incentive to 
vote expressively. If analysis of how citizens vote is sensitive to analysis of why 
citizens vote, choice at the ballot box is likely to be far more expressive than 
implied by instrumental assessments of the costs and benefits of fiscal federalism. 
                                                 
21 There is evidence that some voters mistakenly exaggerate the significance of their vote (Clarke et 
al., 2004). Quattrone and Tversky (1986) argue that some voters confuse the causal impact of action 
with the diagnostic signal (they vote because they know that if sufficient numbers voted for a preferred 
outcome, this outcome would be achieved, thereby confusing a diagnosis with a causal impact). 
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